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Abstract 16 
Background 17 
The preventative paradigm of preconception care is receiving increasing attention, yet its 18 
boundaries remain vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. 19 
Crucially, it remains unclear just who is to be considered a ‘potential parent’, how soon they 20 
should take up preconception responsibilities, and how weighty their responsibilities should 21 
be.   22 
Discussion 23 
In this paper, we argue that a normal potential parent of reasonable prudence has a moral 24 
duty to adequately optimize the conditions under which she or his reproductive partner will 25 
conceive, though a proportionality calculus calls for toleration of several forms of 26 
preconception behavior that are non-ideal from the perspective of reproductive risk. We 27 
distinguish between five categories of potential parents to which different duties of 28 
preconception care should be ascribed. This framework is advanced to assign preconception 29 
care responsibilities with more precision than is often done in the current debate on 30 
preconception care. We conclude by applying our theoretical framework to three types of 31 
preconception care interventions: consumption of folic acid; keeping one’s weight under 32 
control; and engaging in preconception genetic screening. Our analysis shows that the 33 
literature on preconception care often glosses over crucial distinctions between different 34 
types of potential parents and uses a notion of preconception beneficence that may be 35 
overly demanding. Nevertheless, preconception moral duties will often be weighty and 36 
reluctance to accept such duties on account of the burden they impose do not warrant 37 
preconception insouciance.  38 
Summary  39 
To avoid misplaced responsibility ascriptions in the growing field of preconception care, 40 
distinctions must be made between different types of potential parents to whom different 41 
degrees of preconception responsibility apply. We present such a preliminary framework 42 
and bring it to bear on the cases of folic acid consumption, obesity and genetic testing. 43 
 44 
Key words: preconception care, beneficence, folic acid, obesity, genetic testing 45 
46 
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1. Background 47 
According to the Health Council of The Netherlands, ‘preconception care’ (henceforth PCC) 48 
refers to the large cluster of interventions “aimed at ensuring that couples who wish to have 49 
children start a pregnancy under the best possible conditions” [1]. Though clearly 50 
demarcated at one end by the occurrence of conception, at the other end the boundaries of 51 
PCC can be vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Temporally, 52 
the concept of PCC can be understood to refer to all acts and omissions which might affect 53 
the good of future persons, which at the extreme include the acts and omissions of distant 54 
ancestors. Agentially, PCC can refer to a broad array of agents from ‘potential parents’ and 55 
all the subcategories thereof (see below) over myriad medical professionals to moral 56 
communities and political institutions. Instrumentally, the armoury of PCC can be stretched 57 
to include not only specific medical interventions and family planning but all kinds of acts 58 
and omissions that are instrumental in creating the best possible (or at least minimally 59 
decent) conditions in which to conceive future persons.  60 
In this paper, we start by briefly sketching a variety of PCC measures that contemporary 61 
potential parents could engage in, thereby giving an idea of the large number of options 62 
currently available to conceive under optimal or minimally decent conditions. Second, we 63 
seek to provide a categorization of the ethically relevant types of ‘potential parents’. Third, 64 
we develop a normative argument about what the ethical principles of beneficence and 65 
nonmaleficence demand of potential parents. Finally, we apply the resulting general 66 
conception of potential parents’ preconception responsibilities to three cases: consumption 67 
of folic acid; avoidance of obesity; and undergoing screening for genetic risk.  68 
2. Discussion 69 
What can potential parents do? 70 
The PCC-armoury available today contains a wide range of sufficiently effective, evidence-71 
based interventions for potential parents to merit considering them [1]. For the purposes of 72 
this paper, it is sufficient to give an idea of the demands that a fully-fledged PCC regime 73 
would put on potential parents. They would be asked to: (1) follow a number of specific 74 
dietary prescriptions; (2) take specific supplements; (3) avoid obesity and anorexia; (4) 75 
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moderate or abstain from use of alcohol, tobacco, and various other recreational drugs; (5) 76 
avoid specific environmental exposures and chemicals; (6) avoid excessive psychological 77 
stress; (7) take specific precautionary measures in case of maternal health problems or when 78 
taking certain forms of medication prior to conception; (8) avoid consanguinity and (in case 79 
of suspected significant risk) undergo genetic screening and, if necessary, take appropriate 80 
measures, such as using assisted reproduction techniques, choosing a different reproductive 81 
partner or abstaining from reproduction; and last but not least (9) time conception at an 82 
‘optimal age’ via contraception and other means of family planning.  83 
In regions with well developed health care systems, the incidence of many forms of adverse 84 
pregnancy outcomes has decreased dramatically throughout the 20th and early 21st 85 
Century. However, as the latest March of Dimes Global Report on Birth Defects shows, the 86 
incidence of birth defects remains considerable everywhere [2]. According to this report, 87 
worldwide, approximately 8 million children per year were born with a serious birth defect 88 
of genetic or partially genetic origin – i.e. 6 percent of all births. In France, the country for 89 
which the March of Dimes reported the smallest number of birth defects, there were still 90 
39.7 children per 1000 live births born with a serious congenital abnormality. Around the 91 
globe, human reproduction remains far from risk-free, and intensified PCC is one promising 92 
avenue to reduce human suffering. Moreover, the case for intensified PCC gains all the more 93 
urgency if one factors in the number of abortions which often entail psychological damage, 94 
physical pain, and also grave health risks to the mother when sub-optimally performed [3]. 95 
Many of these risks could have been avoided by better access to and use of contraceptives 96 
or by the adoption of additional PCC measures to improve the timing of the pregnancy and 97 
the viability and health of the child [3]. 98 
Who is a ‘potential parent’? 99 
A contemporary potential parent may be confronted with her or his (alleged) PCC 100 
responsibilities by at least three groups:  101 
a) public health and child care providers who seek to enlist potential parents in their 102 
respective projects, as well as personal health care providers who provide directive 103 
counselling; 104 
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b) private for-profit providers of PCC interventions, such as direct-to-consumer genetic 105 
screening and counselling companies who have a commercial interest in creating 106 
demand for their services; and 107 
c) particular moral communities (e.g. anti-abortion activists) who hold moral views that 108 
prescribe duties of PCC to potential parents.  109 
However, it is often unclear exactly who these groups are targeting. At times, only 110 
prospective parents are being addressed (e.g. as in the above characterization of PCC by the 111 
Health Council of The Netherlands). At other times, the category of addressees is expanded 112 
to include everyone who is (presumably) fertile or is nearing fertility (see for example the 113 
recent proposal by the UK Human Genetics Commission to offer genetic screening during the 114 
final years of secondary education [4]). This shows that many different types of ‘potential 115 
parent’ can be identified to which very different degrees of responsibility might apply. In this 116 
section, we outline a categorization of potential parents in which a balance has been struck 117 
between precision and practicability. Our categorization roughly follows the lines of 118 
probability and intention to conceive, where ‘probability’ includes (presumed) capacity as 119 
well as behaviour. Despite first appearances, it does not necessarily reflect a linear temporal 120 
order. We distinguish the following five categories: 121 
1) Prepubertals nearing fertility (no capacity, no behaviour, no intention).  122 
2) Fertile persons who are not sexually active (or only non-coitally) (capacity, no 123 
behaviour, no intention). 124 
3) Sexually active persons with no intention to conceive in the foreseeable future 125 
(capacity, behaviour, no intention). This category also includes persons who are duly 126 
compliant in their use of contraceptives, but whose contraceptives are not fully 127 
reliable. 128 
4) Sexually active persons with an unclear intention, who wilfully abstain from 129 
contraception and leave it to chance/nature whether conception will occur or not 130 
(capacity, behaviour, intention unclear). 131 
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5) Prospective parents: fertile , sexually active persons who intend to conceive in the 132 
foreseeable future (capacity, behaviour, intention). This category also includes 133 
persons using assisted reproductive technologies. 134 
Bearing these distinctive categories of potential parents in mind will help to avoid making 135 
category mistakes such as lumping together too many different types of potential parents 136 
when ascribing preconception duties of care to them and expecting them to meet those 137 
duties (possibly backed up with sanctions if they do not). However, in some forms of PCC 138 
awareness-raising, there may be good reasons to lump all potential parents together. For 139 
instance, one powerful argument for a non-stop stance of PCC prudence (for all potential 140 
parents) is the high incidence of unintended and ill-planned pregnancies. On some 141 
estimates, unintended pregnancies alone amount to 41% of pregnancies worldwide and 142 
remain prevalent in developed regions [3]. Indeed, in the categorization outline above, 143 
unplanned or ill-planned conception might occur in all groups who have the capacity to 144 
conceive and are sexually active. 145 
What should potential parents do?  146 
The question arises, however, as to what constitutes ‘good planning’, and to what extent 147 
and on which grounds this can be morally demanded of potential parents. One possible 148 
ground is a duty of beneficence, i.e. a duty to advance the good (of others), often by active 149 
intervention [5]. Such a duty can be said to hold if not generally, then at least for persons 150 
with specific relational roles, such as a parent towards his or her (future) child. Referring to 151 
the work of Derek Parfit, Savulescu and Kahane observe that “in selecting a more 152 
advantaged child we are also bringing a different person into existence.” This poses a ‘non-153 
identity problem’ as to “what might ground a moral obligation or reason to select such a 154 
child” [9: 277]. As noted by Savulescy and Kahane: “PB is compatible with different accounts 155 
of reasons to select future children. It can take either a wide person-affecting form or an 156 
impersonal form. According to the wide person-affecting version, our reason to select the 157 
child with better prospects is that that child will benefit more than the other would by being 158 
caused to exist. According to the impersonal version, our reason is that selecting the most 159 
advantaged child would make the outcome better, even if it is not better for the child 160 
created. It is possible to support PB on either view. If by selecting a child with better 161 
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prospects we are also benefiting her, then this is a significant reason to make this choice. If 162 
we prefer not to speak of benefit in such cases, then we can say that there is a significant 163 
reason to select the more advantaged child simply because this will be the better outcome” 164 
[9: 277].  By way of illustration, with all other things being equal, if one can either put a 165 
‘bundle of joy’ or a ‘bundle of suffering’ on the planet, there would be a strong moral 166 
obligation to conceive a joyous rather than a tormented child [9: 279].  167 
Another possible ground is a duty of nonmaleficence, a duty not to harm others, often by 168 
passive abstention [5]. Nonmaleficence will often be less demanding than beneficence, but 169 
on the other hand it may be demanded of more persons, for instance universally and not 170 
only of those standing in some specific relational role. If some potential parent would only 171 
have to be nonmaleficent in relation to her potential future child, more leeway should be 172 
given to her own right to autonomy: she should then be free to live her life as she sees fit 173 
without being duty-bound to procure the good (for someone else). She should only refrain 174 
from harming others.  175 
Preconception beneficence - Above all, do good towards one’s potential child? 176 
Many contemporary ethicists would argue that the prime focus of reproductive decision 177 
making should be the wellbeing of the resultant child. To engage in PCC from the motive of 178 
unburdening or strengthening society or of satisfying the parents’ instrumental plans with 179 
regard to the child would be open to the same criticisms that have profoundly discredited 180 
the eugenic reproductive schemes prevalent from the end of the 19th Century up to the late 181 
mid-20th Century [6, 7].  182 
Having regard to prioritizing the child’s wellbeing, Savulescu and Kahane defend the 183 
following ‘principle of procreative beneficence’ (PB, first coined in [8]):  184 
If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is 185 
possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible 186 
children they could have, whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available 187 
information, to go best or at least not worse than any of the others. [9: 274] 188 
Although the use of the phrase ‘procreative beneficence’ seems to suggest a principle 189 
relevant to all procreative issues, Savulescu and Kahane formulate the principle in a highly 190 
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targeted way. For instance, they note that: “PB is silent on a number of further questions in 191 
procreative ethics[. For instance it] assumes that a decision to have a child has been taken.” 192 
[9: 274, footnote 3]. Their discussion is also focused on settings involving selection, in which 193 
one can make a choice between different gametes or embryos. Within the bounds of these 194 
constraints, Savulescu and Kahane have made a forceful argument that PB has the force of a 195 
primary moral principle which will often override other principles in play such as procreative 196 
autonomy. In brief, they argue that procreative autonomy allows for parents to intentionally 197 
create a child who, for example,“will live a brief life of misery and torment” [9: 279] even 198 
when they could have alternatively created a child in good health. Savulescu and Kahane 199 
find such parental autonomy morally unacceptable as well as in violation of much common 200 
sense morality. That said, they do allow for parental autonomy to possibly remain a primary 201 
legal right. Moreover, they hold that, other things being equal, PB entails maximizing 202 
parental commitment to provide the best chance for the best possible life. Less far-reaching 203 
aims such as a ‘life worth living’ or a ‘disease and handicap-free life’ will not do.  204 
In this article, we will not contest Savulescu and Kahane’s formulation of the principle, nor 205 
their application of it. Rather, we will take their principle as-is but remove the restriction of 206 
its application to prospective parents so as to find out what it would imply if applied in the 207 
preceding domains of preconception care. Rather than taking on board the additional 208 
question of ‘enhancement’ as Savulescu and Kahane do, in order to retain focus, we will not 209 
contest the conventional ethico-medical standard that the best condition to provide for 210 
future children does not go beyond a ‘normal’ state of disease- and handicap-free existence. 211 
As we do not provide a justification for a principle of PB, those who deny the existence of 212 
such a principle may also find our extension of that principle unconvincing. Alternatively, our 213 
extension of the PB principle may make the account offered by Savulescu and Kahane more 214 
compelling for some. 215 
Interestingly, preconception care advocacy often (implicitly) appeals to PB, and this may 216 
corroborate Savulescu and Kahane’s assertion that PB has substantial commonsensical 217 
appeal. Nevertheless, we will argue that, in the domain of PCC, PB runs up against 218 
formidable competing concerns. This may be sufficient to cast significant doubt on the thesis 219 
that PB can play the role of ‘first principle’ in PCC. If this holds, contemporary PCC advocacy 220 
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may need to fundamentally rethink certain awareness-raising campaigns and PCC 221 
counsellors their counselling practice.  222 
To apply Savulescu and Kahane’s PB in the field of PCC, it would need to be rephrased along 223 
the following lines to constitute a ‘principle of preconception beneficence’:  224 
If one can take/refrain from action prior to conception to, in light of the relevant 225 
available information, significantly increase the likelihood that if one conceives it will 226 
be of a child whose life can be expected to go best or at least not worse than the lives 227 
of any of the other children one may otherwise conceive, then one has a significant 228 
moral reason to take/refrain from such action. 229 
If this would be the moral standard prescribed for all potential parents, they would have to 230 
face up to a long and taxing PCC checklist that will only lengthen as science and technology 231 
increase the range of preconception options that may serve to optimize reproductive 232 
outcomes. Moreover, persons at an ever-widening distance (in time or in intent) from 233 
conception may find themselves being drawn into the expanding sphere of PCC 234 
responsibility. Given that for instance the California Preconception Initiative advocates that 235 
women be made aware of PCC at every medical visit throughout the health care system, 236 
following the dictum “every woman, every time” [9], they might have to answer at every 237 
turn why they are not doing all they can, as soon as they can, to ensure that, should there be 238 
any future pregnancy, it will be a “pregnancy under the best possible conditions” [1].  239 
The practical burden of long-term compliance with a complex set of prescriptions to ensure 240 
a good that may be very distant and/or improbable, is not to be underestimated. As Singh 241 
and colleagues write on the specific topic of contraceptive use:  242 
By the time she is in her mid-40s, a woman with two children will have spent, on 243 
average, only five years trying to become pregnant, actually being pregnant and not 244 
being at risk for another pregnancy for a few months following a birth. To 245 
successfully avoid becoming pregnant before, after or between those two births, 246 
either she will have had to refrain from having sex, or she or her partner will have 247 
had to practice contraception effectively for an average of about 25 years—a hard 248 
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standard of behavior to live up to, even for the most disciplined and highly motivated 249 
individuals. [3]  250 
Although the use of contraceptives has by now (in the developed world at least) become a 251 
more or less accepted responsibility for the majority of sexually active persons, for all its 252 
blessings the effort of maintaining adequate compliance remains a substantial burden. To 253 
this burden, the PCC armoury invites us to add staying informed and up-to-date about the 254 
state-of-the-PCC-art, maintaining dietary and physical exercise routines, avoiding certain 255 
environments and toxins, undertaking medical screenings and check-ups, securing adequate 256 
rearing-resources (not only financial and material but also psychological, pedagogical, social 257 
and cultural) prior to conception, etc.  258 
The mere (potential) availability of some effective PCC intervention is sufficient to impel a 259 
person to justify (if not to others, then at least to herself) why she would not make use of it. 260 
This can be experienced as a ‘technological imperative’, or more generally, as a ‘capability 261 
imperative’: as soon as some newfound mode of intervention is made available, one’s 262 
sphere of possible agency is expanded, and one inescapably finds oneself at liberty to 263 
influence states of affairs where one used to be factually impotent to do so. Any newfound 264 
power thus puts us at liberty to either use or not use it, thereby literally forcing a new 265 
responsibility on us. 266 
As PCC advocates now call for pervasive and perpetual awareness-raising programs aimed at 267 
all potential parents [10], the risk arises that an increasing number of people become 268 
susceptible to criticism of being or having been a ‘failing potential parent’. Moreover, as the 269 
armoury of PCC and its availability expand, people become susceptible to such criticism to an 270 
increasing degree.  271 
From the vantage point of preventative health care, there are good reasons to start 272 
assuming responsibilities of PCC as soon as one nears reproductive age. For instance, many 273 
of the effective PCC interventions are lifestyle and work environment changes, and such 274 
changes are only likely to have sufficient effect by the time conception occurs if they take 275 
place well before conception [1]. In a similar vein, lifestyle habits engaged in during one’s 276 
twenties are likely to become entrenched ways of living for the rest of one’s life, and altering 277 
one’s habits in later years is likely to require greater effort. Thus, as many may fail to muster 278 
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sufficient intrinsic motivation to develop healthy habits and make healthy choices because 279 
the (moral) gratification is too uncertain and/or too remote, they may need to be prodded 280 
and incentivized by others in sufficiently early, constant and intensive ways.  281 
A telling example of such a hands-on incentivizing campaign is the ‘Don’t U Dare’ PCC 282 
promotional video of the March of Dimes foundation [11]. In this promotional video in the 283 
scripted reality format, a PCC coach closely monitors a ‘merely fertile’ woman (category 3) 284 
and (cheerily) chides her for every suboptimal move she makes. Despite its superficial 285 
comedy, this awareness-raising material seems saturated in an emotionally manipulative 286 
discourse of shaming and blaming and may therefore amount to a form of PCC counselling 287 
that is highly directive. Much the same seems to hold for the nation-wide ‘Show Your Love’ 288 
campaign of the US Preconception Health and Health Care Initiative and the California 289 
Preconception Initiative, which suggests to potential parents that if one does not engage in 290 
PCC, one may be lacking basic parental love [12].  291 
In a more comprehensive analysis of PCC, as opposed to the preliminary assessment we are 292 
offering here, one should also scrutinize the extent to which today’s PCC awareness-raising 293 
campaigns may be (co-opted as) modern-day heirs to entrenched community traditions in 294 
which a girl’s identity is narrowly scripted as ‘future mother’ – a script of social expectation 295 
and obligation that can be enforced by playing to fears that if a girl or woman engages in 296 
athletic pursuits, takes on stressful studies or employment, for example, she might be 297 
endangering her central raison d’être: that of being a responsible ‘future mother’. To be fair, 298 
men are also being asked to engage in certain forms of PCC to optimize semen quality or to 299 
aid and support (and, perhaps, to coax and keep compliant) their female reproductive 300 
partner [13], yet overall their potential PCC responsibilities pale in comparison to those 301 
ascribed to women. PCC advocate Merry-K. Moos has engaged with the worry that PCC 302 
might “frame women as nothing more than vessels for growing healthy offspring” [9], and 303 
largely dismisses it. Commentators such as Rebecca Kukla, on the other hand, discuss the 304 
increasing and unreasonable burdens women are expected to accept on their way to 305 
becoming a mother.[14] In a similar vein, PCC is at risk of being co-opted in dubious practices 306 
of “hyperparenting”, where competitive, perfectionist and over-anxious parents seek to 307 
control and plan ahead the lives of their (future) children to an ever increasing extent.[15] 308 
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Messages entailing a substantial responsibility expansion for potential parents can also come 309 
from the very different corner of for-profit health care providers. For-profit entrepreneurs 310 
have a marked commercial interest in inflating notions of individual responsibility and 311 
fanning the flames of hyper-parenting: the more that potential parents believe themselves 312 
to be inadequate, and the more that people consider themselves to be potential parents, 313 
the greater the demand for the services of such entrepreneurs. In the world of direct-to-314 
consumer genetic testing companies such as Counsyl and 23andMe, marketing techniques of 315 
commercial demand creation in the guise of public-spirited ‘awareness-raising’ seem to be 316 
standard fare [16, 17, 18].  317 
Thus, for example, Counsyl, the for-profit provider of a highly media-hyped ‘Universal Test’ 318 
for genetic risk, highlights on its website the following quote of Professor Patrizio, director of 319 
the Yale Fertility Centre: “Every adult of reproductive age should consider the Counsyl test 320 
before pregnancy.” As Counsyl-CEO Srinivasan likes to envision it, his company’s test should 321 
not only be ‘universal’ in its testing capacity but also in its use: “one of our goals is to make 322 
this like the home pregnancy test” [19]. Occasionally such messages are taken to hyperbolic 323 
extremes. For instance, the director of the for-profit Centre for Surrogate Parenting and 324 
leading US radio host Bill Handel has opined that conceiving of a child via coitus has today 325 
become offensively irresponsible: “I always get astounded and offended when people 326 
actually have sex to have kids. I don’t understand that. They shouldn’t do that. You can 327 
always use some high-tech form of reproduction.” [20]  328 
Not only do such for-profit actors often severely overstate the moral obligation of potential 329 
parents to become PCC customers, they also tend to severely overstate the effectiveness of 330 
the services they market. Without proper policies to mitigate misinformation and 331 
manipulative ‘demand creation’, the general public will often not be able to distinguish 332 
between bona fide and not-so-bona fide players in the PCC field [16]. As a result, they are at 333 
risk of lumping all these responsibilizing messages together, thus creating a sense of PCC 334 
responsibility that is needlessly cumbersome. 335 
Nevertheless, though Handel’s suggestion is grossly excessive given today’s state of the art, 336 
Savulescu and Kahane have argued that “[a]s means of selection become safer and our 337 
ability to use them to select non-disease characteristics increases, we believe that PB 338 
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[procreative beneficence] will require most reproducers to select the most advantaged child 339 
unless doing so is predicted to lead to a very significant loss of well-being to existing people.” 340 
[9:281] This implies that, if assisted reproductive technologies would ever turn into full-341 
blooded alternatives that are significantly less risky than natural reproduction, anyone who 342 
has access to such technologies would have significant moral reason to relinquish natural 343 
procreation altogether in order to reproduce in the safer, artificial way. Whether or not one 344 
objects to this specific example, the general point remains that simply by upholding the very 345 
same moral standard that governs today’s use of PCC, potential parents may find themselves 346 
morally obliged to engage in quite unsettling acts and omissions as PCC capabilities expand.  347 
Preconception nonmaleficence and the autonomy of potential parents  348 
We now turn to some arguments which seem to provide legitimate, principled objections to 349 
the primacy of preconception beneficence. If these objections hold, they would relax the 350 
taxing demands of preconception beneficence discussed earlier. 351 
Insofar as a ‘potential parent’ falls beneath certain thresholds of intent to cause conception 352 
and/or probability to cause conception, it becomes problematic if not outright incoherent to 353 
expect such a person to take up certain presumed role responsibilities of a parent. Since she 354 
would not fit the description of a parent or procreator, it would make little sense to ask her 355 
to fulfil particular parental or procreative duties. Indeed, to the extent that potential parents 356 
would not be parents, other principles can assert themselves, most importantly the principle 357 
of individual autonomy. In principle, such ‘non-parents’ should be free to lead their lives 358 
without being excessively constrained by concerns about the wellbeing of unintended and 359 
merely potential children.  360 
This is not to say, of course, that non-parents would thereby be relieved of the general 361 
responsibility to avoid inflicting harm upon others, a duty that stems from the general 362 
principle of nonmaleficence [5]. This universal duty to do no harm, which is codified in some 363 
form in virtually all established moral theories as well as in civil law, applies to non-parents 364 
and parents alike. However, this universal duty of nonmaleficence obviously needs curbing, 365 
lest one is (absurdly) held responsible for all possible harm (no matter how minute) to 366 
anyone (no matter how remote). In order to properly apply the principle of nonmaleficence 367 
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and to discern whether the corresponding duty is at play in a given situation, further stock 368 
concepts from moral philosophy and law need to be brought in [21].  369 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to invoke the concepts of reasonable foreseeability, 370 
adequate control, adequately proximate causes, proportionality, and reasonable prudence: 371 
1. Foreseeability (requiring adequate cognizance by the wrongdoer of the 372 
consequences of his act or omission);  373 
2. Control (requiring adequate control by the wrongdoer over the events in which he 374 
was implicated);  375 
3. Proximate causes (requiring that the act or omission of the wrongdoer was an 376 
adequately proximate cause of the adverse turn of events);  377 
4. Proportionality (requiring that the benefits of the intervention are in proportion to 378 
the effort that must be invested to avoid the wrong). We will consider proportionality 379 
in relation to the standard of a ‘normal person of reasonable prudence’: 380 
preconception acts and abstentions that are disproportionately burdensome to such 381 
a person will not be morally required. Normally proportionality is calculated as 382 
follows: probability of an affliction in a future child x gravity of the affliction / cost of 383 
precaution. With regard to PCC, however, this calculus – already difficult to apply in a 384 
sufficiently precise and methodologically satisfactory way – is further complicated by 385 
the fact that the calculus must be made prior to conception, which can add great 386 
uncertainty and because one has to factor in the probability of conception, which is 387 
highly unclear in most cases. Thus, the calculus to be applied with regard to PCC 388 
takes the following form: probability of conception x probability of affliction x gravity 389 
of affliction / cost of precaution. This added complexity alone has caused certain 390 
judges to declare preconception torts inadmissible [21]. 391 
Applications: folic acid, obesity, genetic testing 392 
In order to more precisely assess the responsibilities of potential parents in specific cases of 393 
PCC, the general conception of preconception responsibility outlined in the previous section 394 
(‘Principles’) needs to be applied to specific PCC interventions and specific types of potential 395 
parents. In this section we will provide three brief casuistic illustrations to put our general 396 
conception of preconception responsibility to work: folic acid, obesity, and genetic 397 
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screening. We will highlight where and why preconception responsibilities significantly 398 
increase or decrease between different types of potential parents. 399 
Folic acid 400 
The potential suffering brought on by neural tube defects such as the gravely adverse 401 
condition of spina bifida is significant and the chance of such defects occurring is 1/1000 for 402 
American procreators [22]. A strong evidence base has been established, indicating that the 403 
consumption of folic acid supplements, for a period of about three months prior to 404 
conception, reduces by two thirds the risk of neural tube defects [1].  405 
Given the framework of preconception responsibility outlined above, does this make it 406 
morally required for any normal, reasonably prudent potential parent to begin taking folic 407 
acid in due time?  408 
Cognizance. One needs to be aware of the importance and possibility of achieving an 409 
optimal folic acid intake in order to be able to do so in a timely fashion. This requires 410 
education via awareness-raising campaigns, timely advice from GPs, obstetricians, etc. 411 
Unfortunately, even in countries such as The Netherlands, where efforts at widespread 412 
informational campaigns on folic acid have been made, many women remain unaware about 413 
the existence and importance of folic acid [1]. As things stand, this can hardly be blamed on 414 
a failure of these women to have solicited proper and timely advice on preconception care. 415 
This may surely change, however, once folic acid intake becomes a standard fixture within 416 
public health education.  417 
Control. Provided that one has ready access to folic acid (financial, logistic and otherwise; 418 
conditions that may again not be met in many situations), the intake of this supplement is 419 
quite feasible and does not seem to be very demanding, neither as regards expenditure of 420 
money, time, or effort, nor endurance of side-effects (optimizing folic acid levels does not 421 
produce any negative side-effects for the mother-to-be).  422 
Causation. Should one forego folic acid intake, this omission would become an important co-423 
cause of (the higher probability of) eventual neural tube defects in future offspring.  424 
Proportionality. A normal prospective mother of reasonable prudence can reasonably be 425 
expected to shoulder the very minor burden of taking folic acid tablets, and reproductive 426 
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partners can equally be expected to support and stimulate their child-bearing reproductive 427 
partners to do so [13]. Even in the presence of multiple other demands and given the daily 428 
hustle and bustle of everyday life which can complicate proper compliance with prescribed 429 
medical routines, this does not impose an unreasonable or disproportionate burden.  430 
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. Given that prospective parents are already 431 
explicitly assuming a parental role identity, they have special duties of procreative 432 
beneficence towards their future child and should first optimize their folic acid levels. 433 
Potential parents of category 4 – sexually active but leaving possible conception up to 434 
chance – also have an elevated moral duty. They should either start using contraceptives or 435 
else optimize their folic acid levels. Concerning potential parents who use contraception, 436 
some PCC advocates argue that the packages of birth control pills should advise that upon 437 
stopping with birth control pills in order to try to conceive, one should immediately switch to 438 
folic acid supplements [1]. On our analysis, such initiatives are warranted. Moreover, this 439 
advice could be broadened to include the information that, given the high incidence rates of 440 
unplanned pregnancy, any (presumably) fertile and sexually active woman (i.e. not only 441 
those in category 5 but also those in categories 4 and 3) should consider optimizing her folic 442 
acid level to decrease the risk of neural tube defects. Persons in the other categories are so 443 
far removed from a potential conception that they have no duty of preconception 444 
beneficence. They are free to decide for themselves whether or not they take folic acid.  445 
Obesity 446 
The potential adverse pregnancy outcomes brought on by conception and gestation in an 447 
overweight body can be severe (increasingly so as one moves towards actual (morbid) 448 
obesity). Paraphrasing the synopsis of several systematic reviews provided by the Health 449 
Council of The Netherlands [1], compared to women of normal weight (BMI between 20 and 450 
25), for obese women (BMI 30<) the risk of diabetes is increased by a factor of 1.4 to 20, the 451 
risk of hypertension by 2.2 to 21.4, and the risk of pre-eclampsia by 1.2 to 9.7. These factors 452 
increase the risk of harming the foetus, making the incidence of neural tube defects rise by a 453 
factor of 1.5 to 3.0 times in children of obese mothers and the risk of stillbirth by a factor of 454 
2.5 to 3.4. These risks are also elevated, albeit to a lesser degree, for overweight persons 455 
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(BMI 25-30). A clear solution to reduce these risks would be the timely optimization of one’s 456 
body weight.  457 
Given the framework of preconception responsibility outlined above, should any normal, 458 
reasonably prudent potential parent normalize her body weight before attempting 459 
pregnancy or if there is a risk of an unplanned pregnancy? 460 
Cognizance. In contrast to public knowledge on folic acid, it is widely known that abnormally 461 
high body weight is related to a host of health problems. However, the link between body 462 
weight and health problems of potential future offspring is likely to be substantially less well-463 
known. For instance, without scientific knowledge on the issue, some might even speculate 464 
that being overweight may provide a better, more nurturing conceptive and gestational 465 
environment.  466 
Control. Reducing and/or substantially changing the nature of one’s food intake can be very 467 
demanding to many people, for reasons of individual psychology, group psychology, 468 
(financial) access to healthy food, etc. It will often require a trying expenditure of time, effort 469 
and possibly money. In some cases, problematic body weight is not (or not primarily) the 470 
result of one’s behaviour, but a largely inescapable outcome of a genetic constitution, a 471 
medical condition, or a medication regime. Case by case, and risk group by risk group, these 472 
factors should be taken into account in the calculus of personal responsibility. That said, 473 
many overweight persons are in a position to optimize their body weight.   474 
Causation. Being overweight prior to conception can causally contribute to several forms of 475 
adverse pregnancy outcomes [1]. To the extent that it is the overweight persons’ acts and/or 476 
omissions that causally brought about their risk-increasing body weight, they open 477 
themselves up to being held morally accountable for exposing their potential child to the 478 
attendant risks. However, considerations of proportionality might substantially relax, if not 479 
absolve them of, such moral accountability. 480 
Proportionality. For several reasons, it would be problematic to make the moral demand on 481 
overweight potential parents to suspend all attempts at conception until they have 482 
successfully optimized their weight. For instance, the weight-optimizing enterprise might 483 
take so much time for certain persons that, by the time they reach an optimal weight, other 484 
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obstacles have come into play (e.g. maternal age over 35, loss of a willing reproductive 485 
partner, etc.). Moreover, persons burdened by a relative lack of financial resources or by 486 
certain genetic or medical conditions may find it virtually impossible to optimize their body 487 
weight, or doing so may be disproportionally difficult for them. Therefore, it would be 488 
problematic to demand compliance. Rather, only a proportionate, sustained effort to 489 
optimize one’s weight can reasonably be demanded [23]. Although fertile persons with 490 
weight problems could disregard all directive messages and simply go ahead and conceive, 491 
that would constitute a (legally permissible yet) morally tainted exercise of their 492 
reproductive liberty. 493 
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. Prospective parents, already having a future 494 
child in view, would also need to invest such effort out of their duty of procreative 495 
beneficence. For potential parents of category 4, who are leaving it up to chance if they get 496 
pregnant/impregnate, a heightened moral imperative to keep their body weight under 497 
control also holds. Considering the fact that tackling overweight will often be a much more 498 
demanding task than taking folic acid, other types of potential parents – who have only a 499 
lesser or no duty of beneficence – should only be non-directively informed about the risks to 500 
future children of preconception overweight, for, in view of the demandingness, the 501 
proportionality calculus would allow more leeway to the potential parents’ lifestyle choices 502 
or habits over their duty of non-maleficence. 503 
Genetic screening 504 
A great number of diseases and handicaps are rooted in one’s genetic make-up, which in 505 
most cases comes from one’s genetic parents. Increasingly, potential parents can find out 506 
whether they are carriers of genetic factors that significantly increase the probability of 507 
adverse pregnancy outcomes, most commonly for autosomal dominant or autosomal 508 
recessive disorders, for which there is, respectively, a ½ or ¼ chance of producing the 509 
disorder in one’s offspring.  510 
Given the framework of preconception responsibility outlined above, should any normal, 511 
reasonably prudent potential parent undergo genetic screening before attempting to 512 
conceive?  513 
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Cognizance. Basic knowledge about genetic risks clearly remains an issue about which more 514 
public health education is needed [24]. The same holds a fortiori for the additional 515 
awareness that genetic screening prior to conception is available and might be helpful. 516 
However, public knowledge levels on these issues seem likely to increase given the 517 
emergence of public campaigns on PCC and on genetic literacy, as well as the publicity 518 
campaigns by commercial (quasi-)direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies. 519 
Control. The Health Council of The Netherlands argues that “the scenario must be avoided in 520 
which a decision not to make use of a service such as preconceptual carrier screening is 521 
regarded as irresponsible”, based in part on the consideration that one’s genetic constitution 522 
is not a ‘controllable’ factor in the sense that for instance one’s overweight or one’s folic 523 
acid level are ‘controllable’ [1]. However, even though one cannot exercise any meaningful 524 
control over one’s genetic constitution, in many cases one can exercise meaningful control 525 
over  how one will expose one’s future offspring to risks stemming from it. 526 
Causation. Though one is not oneself the cause of one’s genetic constitution and thus must 527 
surely not be blamed or in any way judged for it, one can become the cause of an adverse 528 
condition in one’s offspring due to one’s unwillingness to undertake genetic screening. 529 
Proportionality. How should we map the benefit/burden calculus for genetic screening? On 530 
the benefit side, the amount of suffering one can avoid is significant, as shown for instance 531 
by the Cypriot campaign against beta-thalassemia [25]. Equally, the degree of certainty that 532 
one will effectively avoid significant suffering can often be high, for instance when one has 533 
been diagnosed with a dominant or recessive autosomal disorder , or when one is a member 534 
of a population with an elevated risk, e.g. 1 in 30 Dutch persons is a carrier of cystic fibrosis 535 
[1]. On the burden side, undergoing genetic carrier screening demands very little of a 536 
potential parent: providing a blood or sputum sample or even only a buccal swab. The 537 
burdens rather lie in handling knowledge regarding one’s genetic status (which may reveal 538 
much more than just the risks for one’s future offspring, namely risks to oneself and to one’s 539 
genetic relatives). To avoid such burdens, one may want to invoke a ‘right not to know’. 540 
Another set of substantial burdens pertains to the affliction-avoiding interventions one may 541 
have to engage in when a substantial genetic risk has been found (e.g. the strains of 542 
undergoing IVF/PGD cycles). Moreover, in regions without publicly subsidized health care for 543 
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these purposes, both the testing itself and the ensuing interventions can be extremely costly 544 
for potential parents. Then again, when one takes into account the potentially astronomical 545 
costs to a person of living with a severe affliction, plus the costs of (lifelong) care for severely 546 
afflicted persons, even high costs of tests and interventions may nonetheless be relatively 547 
proportionate. A normal and reasonably prudent prospective parent (i.e. category 5), who 548 
has good reason to assume that he/she belongs to a group with an elevated genetic risk of 549 
severely afflicting future offspring, would be acting morally irresponsibly if he/she knowingly 550 
foregoes genetic carrier screening. 551 
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. In Cyprus, persons who want to marry before 552 
the Cypriot Orthodox Church (and who can be reasonably expected to try to bear children) 553 
are obliged to first have their carrier status for beta-thalassemia checked [25]. On our 554 
analysis, such a scheme seems to be based on a proper conception of preconception 555 
beneficence. All prospective parents (i.e. those in category 5) whose genetic predicament is 556 
known to be analogous to that of the Cypriots can reasonably be expected to engage in 557 
genetic screening for their respective risk factors. In another scheme proposed by the UK 558 
Human Genetics Commission, population-wide genetic screening for a variety of genetic 559 
risks would be organized during the final years of the secondary education system [4]. 560 
According to this proposal, adolescents should be merely informed in an entirely non-561 
directive way of the possibility of being screened and about what screening can achieve,. 562 
One might argue that a large-scale implementation of genetic screening would inadvertently 563 
give rise to some implicit directivity. Yet on our analysis, within proper bounds, such 564 
awareness-raising concerning the preconception responsibilities of potential parents in 565 
categories 1, 2, 3, and certainly 4, may be justified. For instance, to those in categories 1 and 566 
2, one could already mention the moral importance of avoiding severe afflictions in one’s 567 
future children, and leave it to their own discretion to think about the (dis)proportionality of 568 
preemptively investigating their genetic risk factors. For potential parents in category 3 and 569 
certainly to those in category 4, one could both heighten awareness of the likelihood of 570 
unplanned pregnancy and signal the importance (made more acute in view of their coital 571 
activity) of getting to know their genetic risk profiles. A similar conclusion can be reached 572 
starting from a discussion of reproductive autonomy [26]. It must be noted, however, that 573 
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none of this would compromise the right of a potential parent to conscientiously object, 574 
their right to exercise the right not to know, or their right to reproduce. 575 
3. Summary 576 
We began this paper by briefly sketching the state of the art and the state of the debate 577 
regarding PCC. We explained how the PCC paradigm can enlist all sorts of ‘potential parents’ 578 
in its preventative project by imposing some form of preconception responsibility upon all of 579 
them. This identification of large swathes of society as some kind of potential parent seems 580 
to entail a real risk of a ‘responsibility explosion’. If one maps these categories out on the 581 
lifespan of a single person, most people would have to assume at least some minimal form 582 
of PCC responsibility during their entire period of fertility. This situation seems to be further 583 
aggravated by the increasing number of PCC measures that are becoming available and by 584 
the ‘capability imperative’ they inevitably bring about. Given these substantial burdens, we 585 
have attempted to develop a preliminary framework of preconception responsibility that 586 
identifies preconception responsibilities in a sufficiently specific way. To that end, we have 587 
applied a theory of moral responsibility, involving principles of (preconception) beneficence, 588 
(preconception) non-maleficence and individual autonomy, to the cases of folic acid, obesity 589 
and genetic screening.  590 
Our discussion of PCC has been primarily restricted to potential parents. Further work, 591 
seeking to develop a comprehensive rather than a preliminary ethical framing of PCC such as 592 
the one offered here, needs to take into account much broader socio-political realities and 593 
normative frameworks. Indeed, an in-depth analysis would also need to investigate the PCC 594 
responsibilities of medical professionals, health care institutions, the potential parent’s 595 
government, employer, and cultural, social and family communities. Our focus on potential 596 
parents is by no means intended to detract from the responsibilities of the other actors and 597 
institutions in the field of PCC.  598 
We have argued that prospective parents as well as several other categories of potential 599 
parents have at least a minimal moral duty to sufficiently try to optimize the circumstances 600 
of conception. Although we have sought to apply only a ‘minimal’ standard (i.e. one that 601 
prescribes a ‘moral minimum’), circumstances may conspire to make the commitment to 602 
only ‘minimal’ duties of PCC overly burdensome nonetheless. That would be a sufficient 603 
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reason to reject even some of such ‘minimal’ duties. It would certainly be absurd to argue 604 
that an agent X has a duty Y, if X is irremediably incapable of meeting duty Y, just as it would 605 
be unreasonable to expect from potential parents that they perform supererogatory acts of 606 
PCC. 607 
There are many cases in which realizing one’s basic moral duties in no more than a minimally 608 
sufficient way may in practice require sustained attentiveness over a long period of time, as 609 
well as intensive effort and substantial sacrifice of self-centred activity. The current armoury 610 
of PCC has not yet amassed to such a dramatic extent that the default, responsible way to 611 
procreate would require the use of artificial reproductive technologies as Bill Handel would 612 
have it – indeed it seems highly doubtful that such a scenario would ever come about. 613 
Nevertheless, it will probably already be hard for many people today to adequately 614 
discharge themselves of the minimal PCC duties advocated here. The strains involved will 615 
only increase as new effective means of PCC interventions are made available. The strains 616 
themselves, however, should not be invoked as an argument against PCC, as long as a 617 
normal potential parent of reasonable prudence can be expected to bear such strains in 618 
order to reduce the likelihood of serious adverse pregnancy outcomes. 619 
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